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• Given the rapid and ongoing integration
of the global economy, the role of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as
the institution charged with promoting
global ﬁnancial stability has never been
more relevant.
• If the IMF is to be effective in the twenty-
ﬁrst century, there is a need to renew its
role, governance structure, and functions.
• The IMF has embraced the reform process
through the review of its Medium-Term
Strategy championed by Managing
Director de Rato.
• The Bank of Canada has been an active
participant in the reform process, with
particular emphasis on surveillance and
governance reform.
• In support of this participation, research
at the Bank of Canada has focused on a
new framework for IMF surveillance that
clariﬁes the objectives, scope, and conduct
of surveillance.
• Researchers have also explored how en-
hancing the IMF's governance structure
could further strengthen the Fund's
decision-making process.
• The ultimate aim of these reform efforts
is to enhance the IMF's ability to promote
crisis prevention and support a well-
functioning international ﬁnancial system.
* We would like to thank Tiff Macklem, Graydon Paulin, Larry Schembri, and
our colleagues at the Department of Finance and the Ofﬁce of the Canadian
Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund for helpful comments.
ecent decades have witnessed an unprece-
dented degree of integration among global
ﬁnancial markets. While globalization has
brought tremendous benefits, it has also
brought many risks. Ongoing global imbalances,
concerns over the extent of global liquidity, and the not-
so-distant experience of financial crises in Latin America
and East Asia highlight the importance of maintaining
a well-functioning and stable international financial
system. In particular, the global nature of these issues
has prompted policy-makers to advocate for a new,
reinvigorated role for the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) (King 2006; Dodge 2006).
Clearly, the IMF is still the institution charged with
maintaining global financial stability, and it has evolved
over the past decades to fulﬁll this role. But concerns
remain that its governance structure and policy
instruments have not kept up with the changing
global economic landscape. Simply put, the world
for which the IMF was founded, one characterized by
fixed exchange rates, capital controls, and limited
international trade, no longer exists. Instead, the IMF
must operate in a world of greater exchange rate
flexibility, trade liberalization, and capital account
openness,andonewhereemerging-marketeconomies
(EMEs) have grown in importance. This has necessi-
tated a reconsideration of the role, governance structure,
and functions of the IMF.
To this end, in 2005, the IMF Managing Director (MD)
issued a report on the IMF’s Medium-Term Strategy
(de Rato 2005). Aimed at renewing the IMF’s man-
date, this initiative offers the opportunity to compre-
hensively review all aspects of the Fund. How best to
renew the IMF for the twenty-first century is currently
the subject of an active international discussion, and
few aspects of the IMF have been left unexplored.
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Six main areas of reform are under consideration:
(i) quota, voice, and representation; (ii) internal
governance; (iii)surveillance;(iv)lendinginstruments;
(v) finances; and (vi) the Fund’s role in low-income
countries.
Governor David Dodge and Deputy
Governor Tiff Macklem have been
actively promoting improved
surveillance as well as governance
reform.
The IMF has an important role to play in the interna-
tional monetary system. To this end, the Bank is working
to facilitate the reform process in many of the areas
described above. In particular, Governor David Dodge
(2006)andDeputyGovernorTiffMacklem(2006)have
been actively promoting improved surveillance as well
as governance reform. But it is important to stress
that all six elements of the proposed plan for renewal
are designed to ﬁt together and reinforce each other.
With this is mind, the objective of this article is to
examine each of the respective reform issues and
explore how they might be resolved. The article also
highlights the Bank’s research contribution to this
process, which offers perspectives rooted in economic
analysis, empirical evidence, and experience.1
The article is organized as follows: the next section
examines governance issues, including quota and
how decisions are made. It is followed by a discussion
of the reform of the IMF’s instruments, namely, sur-
veillance and lending. Issues relating to IMF finances
and the role of the Fund in low-income countries are
then reviewed, and the article concludes with a brief
summary.
Governance
The IMF’s governance structure is organized into ﬁve
broad groups: the Board of Governors, the Board of
Executive Directors, the Managing Director (MD) and
the staff, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO),
and the International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee (IMFC) (see Chart 1).2
As the highest decision-making body of the IMF, the
Board of Governors oversees the Fund’s broad policy-
formation process and focuses on such issues as quota
reviews and accepting new members. Each member
of the IMF— there are currently 185 members—has
1.   These efforts are not new: the Bank has been involved in IMF reform for
many years (Lafrance and Powell 1996; Powell 2001; Haldane and Kruger
2001–2002).
2.  See Van Houtven (2002) for detailed information on the IEO and IMFC.
Source: International Monetary Fund
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a Governor on the Board. Voting is based on a combi-
nation of quota and basic votes.3 The United States
accountsfor17.1percentofquota,andmajoradvanced
countries for 45.2 per cent (Table 1). Overall, developed
countries have a majority of IMF quota.
The enormous size of the Board of Governors naturally
implies that most decision making is delegated to
the Board of Executive Directors, and the Articles of
Agreement allocate to the Executive Board all those
powersnotexplicitlyreservedfortheBoardofGovernors.
The Executive Board consists of 24 directors and the
MD. The United States, Japan, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia
each have their own director; the remaining director-
ships are based on country groupings, with the larg-
est country often holding the directorship.4 The MD
manages the day-to-day operations of the IMF based
on recommendations and advice provided by the
staff. The MD also plays an important role in guiding
the IMF, working closely with the Executive Board,
whose meetings he, or his deputies, chairs. There
are two distinct aspects to IMF governance: repre-
sentation and decision making. Each will be consid-
ered in turn.
Representation
Quotas are a fundamental issue for the IMF, since they
affect many aspects of the Fund’s governance and
activities, and especially members’ voice and representa-
3. Each member receives 250 basic votes plus one vote for each SDR (Special
Drawing Right) 100,000 of quota.
4.   For example, the constituency that consists of Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Ireland, Jamaica, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines is represented
by the Canadian director.
Advanced economies 60.5 79.3 55.1
United States 17.1 29.8 20.5
Major advanced 45.2 64.0 43.0
Developing and transition
countries 39.5 20.7 44.9
Table 1
Quota Distribution
Quota GDP GDP share
share (%) share (%)* (PPP) (%)**
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
* Share of world gross domestic product (GDP) based on average GDP,
2002–2004, at market exchange rates
** Share of world GDP based on average GDP, 2002–2004, at purchasing-
power parity (PPP) exchange rates
tion.Quotasdeterminemembers’(i)votingpower at the
Board of Governors and the Executive Board (together
with the basic votes), (ii) ﬁnancial contribution, and
(iii) access to resources. Members’ quotas are based
on a combination of five formulas that are determined
by four variables: gross domestic product (GDP) at
market prices, reserves, openness, and the variability
of current receipts.5 These variables are a measure of
members’ ability to contribute to the Fund’s finances,
as well as their potential demand for Fund resources.
There is currently much dissatisfaction within the
IMF’s membership with respect to quota and voice.
Some countries, especially rapidly growing EMEs, feel
that they are under-represented, since their actual
quota share is significantly below their “calculated
quota,” the figure suggested by the five formulas
(see column 2, Table 2).6 The current formulas are also
complex and, in some cases, can produce counterintu-
itive results. A rise in a member’s GDP, for example,
can sometimes lead to a decrease in its calculated
quota, all else being equal. Moreover, members’
views on the nature of the variables that should enter
the equations differ. For example, a number of devel-
oping countries would prefer that GDP be measured
at purchasing-power parity (PPP) exchange rates (see
Table 1, columns 2 and 3), while many low-income
countries oppose the gradual erosion in their voting
power that has occurred because of the decrease in the
5.   More information on the formulas can be found in IMF (2006b).
6.   Under-representation occurs because quotas are most often adjusted dur-
ing general quota reviews, which are held every ﬁve years and are under-
taken to assess the adequacy of the Fund’s balance sheet. Moreover, the
resulting general quota increases tend to have a large “equiproportional” ele-
ment, which means that new quotas are distributed, for the most part, in pro-
portion to existing quotas, and disparity is only addressed at the margin.
Singapore 0.40 1.92 –1.52
China 3.72 5.20 –1.48
Korea 1.35 2.51 –1.16
Mexico 1.45 1.93 –0.48
Turkey 0.55 0.74 –0.19
Table 2
Quota Under-Representation
Actual Existing Actual quota minus
quota quota formulas existingquotaformulas
(% of total) (% of total) (% of total)
Source: International Monetary Fund6 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
shares, since the relative positions of countries in the
global economy will keep evolving. Ideally, the process
for updating quotas should be timely, relatively auto-
matic, and transparent. Lastly, quota review should
not be considered in isolation: rather, “with a larger
voice comes greater responsibility” (Macklem 2006).
All members should be prepared to shoulder their fair
share of the responsibility for promoting a well-func-
tioning and stable international monetary system.
Decision making
Although much attention is paid to quota, the issue of
how decisions are made at the IMF is also important.
The governance structure of the Fund was founded on
the notion that IMF decision making would need to
command the broad support of its members (Van
Houtven 2002). But some members have expressed
the view that the IMF’s objectives and decisions may,
at times, be determined more by political considera-
tions than by sound economic analysis (Cottarelli 2005;
Calomiris 2000). Moreover, the role and responsibilities
of the Executive Board and the MD can become blurred.
TheExecutiveBoardsitsinalmost“continuoussession,”
working closely with the MD on the day-to-day
business of the Fund. This can make it difﬁcult to
assign clear accountability for decisions.10
Governance issues with respect to both private corpo-
rations and public institutions have received consider-
able attention in recent years. And while governance
structures should be tailored to the speciﬁc circum-
stances of each institution, there are nevertheless some
principles that have emerged as “best practice.” In
particular, institutions can beneﬁt, and hence be more
effective, from having clearly stated objectives, being
transparent in their decision-making process, and pos-
sessing the means to hold each level of decision-maker
accountable. These principles have also been reﬂected
in recent developments in the governance of central
banks. In fact, part of the success of central banks in
maintaining low and stable inﬂation can be attributed
to the fact that they too have improved their govern-
ance mechanisms along the dimensions described
above (Cukierman 1998).
In the same way, the IMF could benefit from considering
these best-practice governance mechanisms (Macklem
2006). Simply, the governance of the IMF could be
further enhanced by having clearly stated objectives,
10. Santor (2006) provides a discussion of decision making and accountability
at the IMF.
ratio of basic votes to the membership’s total voting
power.7 The consequence of quota misalignment is
that some countries do not feel adequately represented
at the IMF, and this lack of appropriate voice and
representation impairs their conﬁdence in the IMF
and, ultimately, in the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the Fund.
In response to these issues, the ﬁrst step in a two-year
reform of quota and voice at the IMF was taken in
September 2006.8 The objectives of the reform are
fourfold: (i) to develop a single quota formula that is
simpler and more transparent than the existing ones,
(ii) to achieve signiﬁcant progress in realigning quota
shares with countries’ relative weight in the global
economy, (iii) to make quota and voting shares in the
Fund more responsive to future changes in the world
economy, and (iv) to enhance the participation and
protect the voice of low-income countries.9
All members will gain if every one of
them is adequately represented, since
the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy
as a truly global institution will be
enhanced.
The updating of quota shares means that, for the shares
of some members to be increased, other members will
have to accept a reduction, since quota shares sum
to 100 per cent. Thus, for the reform to be successful,
members must co-operate and act in the best interest
of the international monetary system. Indeed, all
members will gain if every one of them is adequately
represented, since the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy
as a truly global institution will be enhanced. It would
also be useful to develop a mechanism to ensure that
future quota reviews lead to a regular updating of quota
7.   The absolute level of basic votes has not changed from 250 since the IMF
was created; the share of basic votes in total voting power has fallen from
over 10 per cent in 1945 to 2 per cent at present.
8.   Four signiﬁcantly under-represented members—China, Korea, Mexico,
and Turkey—were granted an increase in their respective quota, totalling
1.8 per cent of total quotas.
9.  The current reform process takes as given the current roles of quota, but
such an approach may be asking too much from a single quota formula, and
consideration could be given to separating access from voice.7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
greater transparency, and greater accountability. This
could be facilitated by a clear separation of the roles
of the Executive Board and the MD. As the MD has
stressed, the Executive Board should focus more on
strategic issues and less onthedetails of the day-to-day
operationsoftheFund.11 For instance, more emphasis
could be placed on setting the objectives of the Fund
and on the design of the policy instruments that are
needed to achieve its goals (i.e., the modalities of sur-
veillance). Then, given a set of clearly deﬁned objec-
tives and instruments, the MD would be responsible
for the implementation of policy and would be held
accountable by the Board. The clarification of the
roles and responsibilities of the Executive Board and
the MD would increase the transparency of the Fund’s
decision-making process, leading to greater account-
ability and, ultimately, a more effective IMF.
The IMF’s Instruments
In order to effectively promote a well-functioning
international monetary system, good governance is
not enough. The IMF must also have the right set of
instruments at its disposal. The Fund relies on the use
of three main instruments: surveillance, lending, and
technical assistance. This section will discuss surveil-
lance and lending. Issues related to technical assistance
will be addressed in the section on the role of the IMF
in low-income countries.
IMF surveillance
The IMF, under its Articles of Agreement, is charged
with maintaining a well-functioning international
financial system. The primary means by which the
Fund seeks to achieve this goal is bilateral surveillance.
Typically conducted through Article IV consultations,
bilateral surveillance is the monitoring of members’
economies, combined with the timely provision of
policyadviceprincipallyaimedatcrisisprevention (IMF
2006c). The Fund also conducts multilateral surveil-
lance: the examination of economic linkages between
countries and international developments, including
the global implications of policies pursued by individ-
ual members. The ﬁndings of multilateral surveillance
are typically reported in the IMF’s World Economic Out-
look (WEO) and Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).
The IMF has responded to the challenges of a rapidly
changing global environment with professionalism,
taking on new responsibilities and developing new
11.  See de Rato (2005).
expertise. However, policy-makers, and the IMF, have
recognized several concerns. First, the legal basis of
surveillance, the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over
Exchange Rate Policies, is outdated (Lomax 2006).
The world for which the 1977 Decision was made no
longer exists, since the global economy is increasingly
interdependentandmarket-based,andflexibleexchange
rates have become more prominent. Moreover, coun-
tries have also become more vulnerable to cross-border
shocks and policy-spillover effects.
Second, the scope of bilateral surveillance is often
very broad, covering issues beyond those directly
relevant for countries’ external stability (Adams 2005).
The IEO (2006) also notes that greater emphasis
needs to be placed on the linkages between the financial
and real sectors, and that multilateral issues addressed
in the WEO and GFSR could be more closely integrated
with bilateral surveillance. Lastly, there are also issues
regarding the institutional framework that supports
Fund surveillance. As the IMF (2005) notes, progress in
recent years notwithstanding, some Article IV reviews
remain unpublished, and as Dodge (2006) observes,
surveillance analysis sometimes lacks candour. More-
over, some members feel that they do not receive
equal treatment from the Fund’s surveillance process
(Akyüz 2005; Lombardi and Woods 2007). With these
concerns in mind, policy-makers, and the IMF itself,
have begun to tackle the issue of surveillance reform.
Towards a new framework for surveillance
Improved surveillance is in the interest of all members,
since it strengthens the Fund’s efforts to maintain
international financial stability, promote orderly
adjustment, and prevent crises. The impetus for
surveillance reform has come from several sources,
including the Bank of England (King 2006), the
United States Treasury (Adams 2005), and the IMFC
(2006). The latter, for example, has emphasized the
need for greater focus on multilateral issues and
consideration of a Surveillance Remit. The Remit
would give the IMF a mandate to carry out surveil-
lance, while establishing a mechanism for holding it
accountable (Lomax 2006).
At the same time, the IMF’s review of its Medium-
Term Strategy identiﬁed surveillance as a key area of
reform (de Rato 2005). With the support of the Executive
Board, the IMF staff is exploring the merits of revising
the 1977 Decision and the adoption of a Remit (de Rato
2006). These are clearly important steps forward. And
to reinforce these efforts, the Bank of Canada has8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
been actively promoting the discussion on surveil-
lance reform (Dodge 2006).
Research at the Bank of Canada has focused on devel-
oping an integrated framework for IMF surveillance
(Lavigne, Maier, and Santor forthcoming). The
framework consists of two elements: the Guidelines
for Economic Policy Frameworks and a renewed
institutional framework, consisting of a Remit, a process
for communicating surveillance, and a means for
ensuring accountability. The Guidelines for Economic
Policy Frameworks revise and update the 1977 Decision:
in particular, the Guidelines seek to outline the objec-
tive and scope of surveillance, as well as delineating
the benchmarks against which members’ economic
policy frameworks will be assessed. To make surveil-
lance more focused, the IMF should assess the over-
all coherence of a country’s exchange rate, monetary,
fiscal, and ﬁnancial policies with a view to analyzing
their effects on external stability. The Guidelines also
serve to clarify and modernize the principles under
which surveillance will be conducted and to reafﬁrm
members’ commitment to the surveillance process
under their Article IV obligations.
Research at the Bank of Canada has
developed an integrated framework
for IMF surveillance which consists
of two elements: the Guidelines for
Economic Policy Frameworks and a
renewed institutional framework,
consisting of a Remit, a process for
communicating surveillance, and a
means for ensuring accountability.
The second element of the proposal develops an
institutional framework that supports the conduct of
surveillance. The key mechanism is a Surveillance
Remit,inspiredbytheworkoftheBankofEngland (King
2006; Lomax 2006). The Surveillance Remit is much
like a performance agreement: it defines the aim of
bilateral and multilateral surveillance and the obliga-
tions of the Fund to pursue this goal and clarifies the
means by which the Fund will be held accountable for
doing so. In essence, members charge the Fund to con-
duct surveillance and, in return, agree to recognize its
role and the policy advice it generates. Importantly,
with its emphasis on increased accountability, the
Remit should heighten the Fund’s ability to provide
candid and objective surveillance advice.12
Taken together, the framework clariﬁes the roles and
responsibilities of the IMF and its member countries
in the surveillance process. It also aims to tie together
the existing proposals for a revised 1977 Decision, the
Remit, and measures for enhancing accountability.
These reforms offer a number of beneﬁts for all mem-
bers. Simply, members can expect to receive focused,
high-quality bilateral and multilateral surveillance
aimed squarely at crisis prevention. Moreover, surveil-
lance will be applied in an even-handed and symmetric
manner, for developed and developing countries
alike. In fact, given their dependence on trade and
capital flows, effective bilateral and multilateral sur-
veillance would be particularly beneﬁcial for EMEs,
since it would help to protect them from being side-
swiped by global economic events. It is often the most
vulnerable countries that are hardest hit by ﬁnancial
crises, and thus they have the most to gain from a
stableinternationalmonetarysystem.Additionally,by
focusing clearly on macro policies related to external
stability, IMF surveillance will avoid mission creep
into structural policies and institutional reform issues.
In sum, these surveillance reforms will help to enhance
the IMF’s ability to promote a well-functioning inter-
national ﬁnancial system.
Lending
Over the years, the IMF has developed various loan
facilities to address the individual circumstances of its
members (Table 3). These facilities can be grouped
into two main categories. The first consists of long-
term loans made to low-income countries through the
PovertyReductionandGrowthFacility.Anevaluation
of these loans by the IEO (2004) suggests that they
have had limited success. The second category refers
to the loans granted to countries experiencing a
financial crisis.13 These are countries that cannot
access sufﬁcient ﬁnancing on affordable terms to meet
their international obligations. This type of IMF
lending aims at facilitating the adjustment policies and
12.  The Remit is supported by a process for communicating surveillance.
Under the framework, the IMF is obligated to communicate its surveillance
activities in a complete, timely, and transparent manner. To ensure that the
Fund fulﬁlls its surveillance obligations, a Framework for Assessing Surveil-
lance is proposed. The MD and the staff will be assessed on whether they
have conducted surveillance in an effective and transparent manner.
13. This category is covered by most of the other facilities and has always rep-
resented the largest share of IMF outstanding credit. The IMF also provides
emergency assistance to countries that have experienced a natural disaster or
are emerging from conﬂict. We do not discuss these loans.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
reforms that these countries must adopt to resolve
their balance-of-payments problems. For instance, in
response to crises in Latin America, Asia, and else-
where, the Fund offered large loans through Stand-by
Arrangements and the Supplemental Reserve Facility,
resulting in high levels of use of its resources (see
Chart 2). Despite this high, and often persistent, level
of lending activity, research suggests that, while it led
to an improvement in borrowing countries’ balance-
of-payments position, the impact on other macroeco-
nomic variables was limited (see de Resende 2007 for
a survey).14 At the same time, many borrowers felt
that the conditions attached to the IMF lending pro-
gram were often too onerous and were not applied
evenly across countries (Goldstein 2000).
Subsequently, many EMEs have, in recent years, accu-
mulated large foreign exchange reserves, possibly to
14.  Some argue that IMF lending can create moral hazard and potentially
distort post-crisis restructuring efforts, leading to poorer macroeconomic
outcomes.
Stand-by Arrangements To help countries resolve short-term
balance-of-payments problems. This is the
main lending facility.
Extended Fund Facility To help countries address longer-term
balance-of-payments problems requiring
fundamental economic reforms
Compensatory Financing To help members experiencing either a
Facility sudden shortfall in export earnings or an
increasein thecostof cerealsimports, often
caused by ﬂuctuations in world commodity
prices.
Supplemental Reserve Exceptional access lending,2 introduced in
Facility 1997 to address the needs of members who
have experienced a loss of market confidence,
leading to massive capital outﬂows
Poverty Reduction and Concessional lending arrangement to assist
Growth Facility (PRGF)3 low-income countries in the development
of a long-term strategy for growth and
poverty reduction
Table 3
The IMF’s Lending Facilities
Facility1 Purpose
Source: International Monetary Fund
1. The IMF also provides emergency assistance to countries that have experi-
enced a natural disaster or are emerging from conﬂict.
2. Exceptional access is deﬁned as access by a member to the Fund’s general
resources (all facilities except the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
and the Exogenous Shocks Facility) in excess of an annual limit of 100 per
cent of the member’s quota, or a cumulative limit of 300 per cent of the
country’s quota.
3. Low-income countries also have access to the Exogenous Shocks Facility
when facing shocks such as changes in commodity prices, natural disas-
ters, and conﬂicts and crises in neighbouring countries that disrupt trade.
self-insure against capital account crises and to avoid
borrowing from the Fund.15 In this context, it has been
suggested that a new precautionary lending instrument
is needed at the IMF to support crisis-prevention efforts
by EMEs active in capital markets and to reduce the
needtoaccumulatereservesforprecautionarypurposes.
Reserve Augmentation Line
Work has thus started at the IMF on the development
of a high-access financing instrument, called the
Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL). This instrument is
designed for crisis prevention and would complement
the current proposals for surveillance reform. The
RAL targets EMEs that have strong macroeconomic
policies, sustainable debt, and transparent reporting
and are making progress in addressing remaining
vulnerabilities.16 It would provide predictable, imme-
15.  Some of these countries also accumulated large holdings of reserves via
sterilized intervention in order to resist a real appreciation of their currencies
and to stimulate the growth of their exporting sector. This may have contrib-
uted to the buildup of global imbalances and led to domestic ﬁnancial vulner-
abilities, especially if carried out using non-market methods.
16.  See IMF 2006a and 2007b. A member would pre-qualify for the RAL
based on a number of criteria. Then, according to the IMF staff’s proposal, the
member would have immediate access to 300 per cent of its quota, should a
capital account crisis occur. Financing would be limited to a short period (12
months, perhaps up to two years), although the possibility of holding several
RALs could exist. It is noteworthy that the views of Executive Directors may
differ from those expressed in this proposal. For instance, some Directors con-
sider that access should be between 300 and 500 per cent of quota. Some
favour a program of longer duration (two or three years, for example). See
IMF 2006d and 2007c for further details. There will be further work and dis-
cussion on the proposed new lending instrument.
Chart 2
Total Credit Outstanding in the IMF’s General
Resources Account
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diate, and large-scale access to Fund resources at the
onset of trouble, which would help to maintain market
confidence and reduce the likelihood of large and
sudden capital outflows that often trigger a full-blown
crisis. Moreover, if the RAL is perceived as a close
proxy for reserves, it would reduce countries’ need to
actually accumulate reserves themselves. The
instrument could serve as a signalling device to ﬁnan-
cial markets to help them make appropriate decisions
regarding the creditworthiness of a member country if
the qualifying criteria adequately measure countries’
economic and ﬁnancial soundness. There are never-
theless some challenges with respect to its design. For
example, the appropriate balance between access and
Fund risk exposure would need to be achieved.
A need to review the framework for crisis
resolution
There is also a need to consider how the RAL fits in
with the Fund’s lending instruments. More generally,
as the joint research by the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England (Haldane and Kruger 2001–2002)
has stressed, the IMF’s framework for crisis resolu-
tion would benefit from clear access rules and limits
on IMF lending. This would ensure that no country
relies on IMF lending as a means of delaying the
policy adjustment required to relieve capital account
pressures, or balance-of-payments problems more
generally. Ideally, IMF lending should help to maintain
stability by providing temporary and limited liquidity
to solvent countries in extreme cases. As well, clear
constraints on IMF lending would ensure that the
private sector plays a crucial part in crisis resolution.
Constraints would also align debtors’ and creditors’
incentives to deal with a crisis and seek co-operative
solutions.
There is also a need to consider how
the RAL ﬁts in with the Fund’s
lending instruments.
Other Reform Issues
Principal among the many other aspects of Fund
reform that were identiﬁed in the IMF’s review of its
Medium-Term Strategy is the pressing need to exam-
ine the Fund’s ﬁnancing model and its role in low-
income countries.
Rethinking the IMF’s ﬁnancing model
A sharp decrease in market borrowing costs and
improved fundamentals in many EMEs has led to a
relatively rapid reduction in the demand for IMF
loans to the lowest level in decades (recall Chart 2).
Although this is a very positive development, the low
demand for IMF resources has put the Fund’s ﬁnances
under pressure and has raised questions about the
viability of its ﬁnancial model. The Fund derives most
of its income from a single source—its lending activities.
It borrows from its members and lends these resources
onacost-plusbasis.Themarginitchargesoveritscost of
funds is the primary source of the income used to
cover administrative expenses. As a result, the Fund’s
current ﬁnancing model implicitly generates incen-
tives towards lending. As well, when demand for Fund
resources is low, the margin required to cover costs
can rise to quite high levels, which could lead to a
further reduction in the demand for Fund resources if
it induces current IMF borrowers to repay the Fund
early and to borrow instead on private markets.17
Some measures to generate additional revenues and
to reduce expenditures have already been put in place
to deal with expected operating losses over the next
few years.18 However, the IMF’s budget difficulties
maynotbetemporary.Althoughthecurrentfavourable
global environment may reflect factors of a cyclical
nature, such as ample liquidity, widespread improve-
ment in the macroeconomic policy frameworks of many
EMEs may have rendered them less likely to access
the IMF’s resources. As a result, even though Fund
lending could increase in the future, it may not do
so to an extent that would make the Fund’s current
ﬁnancing model sustainable. Hence, a fundamental
review of the Fund’s financial model has been required.
Financing reform
Efforts to date have focused on the revenue side of
the IMF’s administrative budget. In May 2006, the
17.  Since January 2005, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Uruguay, and
the Philippines have repaid early their outstanding ﬁnancial obligations to
the Fund. Turkey is currently the largest remaining IMF borrower, accounting
for just over 50 per cent of total outstanding Fund credit.
18.  For example, an account to invest the Fund’s accumulated reserves in a
portfolio of ﬁxed-income securities was created last year to generate addi-
tional revenues. On the expenditure side, the objective is to achieve no
growth in real terms (an increase of 3.5 per cent on a nominal basis) for 2007
and a 1 per cent real reduction (a rise of 2.5 per cent in nominal terms) in 2008
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Committee of Eminent Persons was appointed to
provide an independent view of the options available
to broaden the Fund’s revenue base and to generate
sustainable long-term ﬁnancing for its running costs.
Chaired by Sir Andrew Crockett, President of JP Mor-
gan Chase International and former General Manager
of the Bank for International Settlements, the commit-
tee released its report at the end of January (IMF 2007a).
ItproposedafundamentalchangetotheFund’srevenue
model, basically recommending that the sources and
uses of Fund resources be linked. Thus, the Fund’s
revenues from lending would cover intermediation
costs (and the buildup of reserves). Because of their
nature as a public good, surveillance activities would
be ﬁnanced by means derived proportionately from
resources provided by all members. The committee rec-
ommends paying for the costs of these activities through
expanded investment operations.19 Charges would
cover the costs of capacity-building activities.
The committee’s report provides an important step
forward. It will also be worthwhile to undertake a
review of the scope and size of the Fund’s expenditures.
Indeed, the IMF has a responsibility to its membership
to ensure that it is managed in the most efﬁcient way
possible. Moreover, the review of the Fund’s ﬁnances
cannot be isolated from the other aspects of IMF reform.
Ideally, the funding model should be integrated with
the activities and comparative advantage of the IMF
relative to other international institutions.
The role of the IMF in low-income
countries
The IMF provides two key public goods for low-income
countries. First, technical assistance helps them to
develop the human and institutional capacity to put in
place sound macroeconomic policies and structural
reforms that can reduce their vulnerability to crises
and raise the standard of living of their citizens. Second,
data standards facilitate best practices in data collection
and dissemination. To some extent, the IMF’s respon-
sibilities in these areas are complementary to those of
the World Bank. Both institutions collaborate regularly
and are involved in several joint initiatives.20
Still, with two institutions working on similar initiatives,
there is a need to ensure that overlap is minimized,
while, at the same time, gaps are avoided and respon-
19. Of note, the committee proposes to create an endowment from the sale of
a portion of the IMF’s gold holdings, which would then be invested.
20. The IMF also collaborates with other regional development banks, such as
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank.
sibilities are clear. Recognizing that efforts could be
unnecessarily duplicated, the IMF’s MD, Rodrigo
de Rato, and the President of the World Bank Group,
Paul Wolfowitz, appointed the External Review Com-
mittee on IMF-World Bank Collaboration in March
2006. Chaired byPedroMalan,ChairmanoftheBoardof
Unibanco and a former Minister of Finance of Brazil,
the committee has a mandate to examine the areas of
collaboration between the two institutions and to
propose improvements to ensure that the division of
labour is efficient and effective. The committee released
its report at the end of February (Malan et al. 2007). It
recommended that the collaboration between the
two institutions be strengthened to better reﬂect their
comparative expertise. For example, the committee
advised that the IMF refocus its activities in low-
income countries towards macroeconomic assess-
ments and policy advice and that it gradually with-
draw from subsidized long-term ﬁnancing.
The Report makes a broad set of recommendations
that will need to be carefully considered relative to its
central insight that each institution could beneﬁt
fromfocusing onits comparativeadvantage.Thus, the
IMF would focus on short-term initiatives to promote
the stability of the international ﬁnancial system, tech-
nical assistance in its area of expertise, and its data col-
lection and dissemination efforts, and the World
Bank on longer-term initiatives to foster economic
development and reduce poverty. This would help to
better organize, and thus make more efficient and effec-
tive, the activities of both organizations.
Conclusion
The IMF remains the key institution for promoting a
well-functioning market-based international monetary
system. While it has evolved to meet many of the
challenges of an increasingly integrated global economy,
further reform is needed. The Fund itself has embraced
the reform process, as witnessed by MD de Rato’s
commitment to the review of its Medium-Term Strategy.
The Bank of Canada is involved in facilitating the dia-
logue on IMF reform and is actively engaged in many
of the issues, particularly, governance, surveillance,
and lending facilities.
While the task of reforming a multilateral institution
may seem daunting, the ongoing efforts of the IMF
and its members to seek solutions are encouraging.
The implementation of an ad hoc quota increase for
the Fund’s most under-represented members is a
positive step towards a more comprehensive and
lasting quota reform. Likewise, the move to revise the12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
1977 Decision, in conjunction with the proposal of
the Surveillance Remit, is a significant step forward
in refocusing IMF surveillance. Finally, a rationaliza-
tion of the Fund’s lending instruments and ﬁnances
and a clariﬁcation of its role in low-income countries
would greatly facilitate a more focused, and more
effective, IMF. Taken together, the reforms to the
Fund’s governance, instruments, and policies will be
mutually reinforcing. It is important not only to
improve how the Fund is governed, but also to ensure
that it has the right tools to do its job well.
The ultimate aim of these reform efforts is to create an
institution that is credible and legitimate in the eyes of
itsmembersandeffectiveinsupportingglobalfinancial
stability. By ensuring that the Fund has clear objectives
and the right instruments and governance structure to
support its goals, the IMF can continue to fulfill its
crucial role at the centre of the international monetary
system, to the beneﬁt of all its members.
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